In this article, I share some reflections on progress made on nuclear risk reduction in the autumn of 2022, why this is important and why No-First Use policies are the most relevant to pursue in the current security environment.
Avoiding nuclear war: the case for No-First Use
The potential for nuclear confrontation (be it by design or accident) remain high as Ukraine is turning into a proxy war between Russia and the West. The war has shown Russia to be a defunct great power. Meanwhile America’s relative decline, vis-a-vis China, continues apace.
In War and Change in World Politics (1981) Robert Gilpin argues that such power shifts are inherently dangerous, as they: Encourage opportunistic states to challenge the status quo; foster malicious perceptions of the other’s intentions; tempt declining powers to seek confrontation sooner rather than later; and make miscalculations more likely.
The Ukrainian war is a symptom of great power politics. Russia used its nukes, not for traditional deterrence, but as a shield to wage unjust war. Technological uncertainties stemming from modernized arsenals (and counter measures) translate into uncertainties as to when actual use of nuclear weapons is an option. This encourages proliferation as more midsize powers equate security with deterrence.
The foggier our security environment gets; and the number of potential adversaries rise, the attention allocated to each rival decrease. This increase chances of catastrophic miscalculation. At a time when all principal actors think in terms of national interest, it is important to remember that the common interest of humanity is to halt the first draw.
In this situation, any viable path to nuclear disarmament need to address the threshold of actual use of nuclear weapons. Declaring a no first use policy is the obvious next step towards protecting humanity’s future against nuclear weapons.
It was in this context, that the 191 state parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met for its tenth review conference in New York in August. After three weeks of deliberations and negotiations, the conference wasn´t able to reach consensus on any final document.
This has been widely portrayed as complete failure, which Russia is solely to blame for. This is not entirely correct. In fact, remarkable progress was made at this review conference, not on disarmament, but on risk reduction. The progress made on reducing the risk of actual use of nuclear weapons actually supersedes any previous conference of this sort. Ikeda´s emergency proposal to the NPT review conference lies is at the heart of this remarkable progress.
On July 26th, SGI President Daisaku Ikeda issued a statement to the NPT review conference calling for no first use of nuclear weapons. At a time of historically high tensions globally, and very little hope for multilateral disarmament, Ikeda´s statement contributed to redirecting focus towards what can actually be done to avoid nuclear war. It instilled hope for the ultimate abolition of all nuclear weapons.
In this emergency proposal, Ikeda urges the UN conference to include the following three elements to the its final document. Firstly; that the five nuclear-weapon states (USA, Russia, China, UK and France) immediately pursue measures to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons in accord with their nuclear disarmament commitments as defined by the NPT Article VI. Secondly, that the five nuclear-weapon states, as a matter of highest priority, declare their commitment to the principle of no first use at the earliest possible date. And thirdly; that the principle of no first use be universalized as the security policy of all states possessing nuclear weapons as well as the nuclear-dependent states.
This provided the conference with constructive proposals on how to cool down the overheated security environment, which in turn helped states engage in constructive dialogue. Hence, we saw an optimism not anticipated in first week of the conference. It became clear that the vast majority of states understood the immediate risk of nuclear war as far too high, and that declaring no first use may be the most effective answer to this immediate problem.
Resulting from this unexpected optimism, no first use language was adopted in a NPT draft document for the first time in the treaty´s five decades long history. The draft of August 12th reads as follows: “The nuclear-weapon States and their allies agree to take steps to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines; for nuclear-weapon States this should include the adoption of no- first use or sole purpose doctrines”.
As anyone can see, this is pretty much exactly what Ikeda called for in his emergency proposal. This agreement on no first use language was developed further in the drafts of the 17th and the 22nd of August. This agreement on no first use held all the way until the second last day of the conference, when the nuclear weapons states insisted that the reference to them adopting no first use policies had to be dropped.
By this time, the conference climate had gone sour, mainly over disagreements in regard to the war in Ukraine. This is was made it impossible to reach consensus on a final document on August 26th, the last day of the review conference.
It is now of crucial importance that we do not forget the progress made on no first use during the NPT review conference. As Russia continue to threaten to use nuclear weapons, we should all remember the agreement reached on no first use at the NPT review. Even Russia was part of this initially, which indicates an agreement on this crucial issue is possible.
Facing the immediate risk of nuclear war, we cannot through the “no- first use baby” out with “NPT bathwater”. For the sake of humanity, we should therefore continue to promote no first use policies for all nuclear armed states, following the guidance given on this matter by Ikeda´s statement of July 26th.
Alexander Harang
Co-President of International Peace and Understanding
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